Case Study: Evolution of Counterinsurgency in Iraq
Evolution Of a U.S. General In Iraq
No. 2 Commander Transformed Tactics
By Amit R. Paley and Joshua Partlow
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, February 16, 2008
CAMP VICTORY, Iraq -- When Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno first came to Iraq in 2003, the division he led was quickly accused of overly aggressive tactics that did more to fuel the insurgency than quell it.
But over the past 15 months, Odierno has earned a very different reputation. Even some of his critics now say his tenure as the No. 2 military official in Iraq -- a position he handed over this week -- reflects a newfound understanding of counterinsurgency doctrine and the necessity of using nonlethal tactics to reduce violence in Iraq.
[snipped]
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/15/AR2008021503716.html?wpisrc%3Dnewsletter%26sid%3DST20
No. 2 Commander Transformed Tactics
By Amit R. Paley and Joshua Partlow
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, February 16, 2008
CAMP VICTORY, Iraq -- When Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno first came to Iraq in 2003, the division he led was quickly accused of overly aggressive tactics that did more to fuel the insurgency than quell it.
But over the past 15 months, Odierno has earned a very different reputation. Even some of his critics now say his tenure as the No. 2 military official in Iraq -- a position he handed over this week -- reflects a newfound understanding of counterinsurgency doctrine and the necessity of using nonlethal tactics to reduce violence in Iraq.
[snipped]
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/15/AR2008021503716.html?wpisrc%3Dnewsletter%26sid%3DST20
posted by Patrick Henry at 15:39
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